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ScotRail's operator, ScotRail Trains Ltd (SRT), is publicly-owned and SRT is overseen by Scottish Rail Holdings (SRH), which is wholly owned by the Scottish Government.

However and this is key ScotRail (like virtually all UK train operators) [b]does not generally own the rolling stock (the trains)[/b] themselves. Instead, the trains are owned by independent private companies, known as "rolling stock leasing companies" (ROSCOs), which lease the trains to operators.

Indeed, a freedom-of-information response from the Scottish Government confirms this: "the Scottish Government does not purchase rolling stock. The leasing of rolling stock is funded through the franchisee subsidy." 
Scottish Government

The same arrangement applies (or has applied) across Great Britain, including to the companies that are being taken over by GBR. According to a briefing on the national rail system, the bulk of rolling stock is owned by three main ROSCOs — historically Angel Trains, Eversholt Rail Group and Porterbrook — which lease trains to operating companies.

Over time other leasing companies have also entered the market.

So: ScotRail (and most UK rail operators) run the services but don't own the trains — private leasing companies do.

[b]Why this system exists: the ROSCO model[/b]

When the UK railways were privatised in the 1990s, rolling stock (trains) was separated from operating companies. Rather than each operator buying the trains, they rent them — this avoids the need for operators to raise huge capital to buy trains.

ROSCOs own the trains, maintain them, and lease them out to whichever operator is running services. The operators pay leasing fees, but do not carry the capital cost themselves.

This separation of "ownership (ROSCO)" and "operation (TOC / public operator)" remains the standard across Great Britain.

[b]What this means under GBR / upcoming changes[/b]

Even as companies are "taken over" by GBR or by public-ownership arrangements, that does not automatically transfer ownership of rolling stock — unless the government chooses to buy the trains (or subsidiaries) from ROSCOs.

So under the new regime, it's quite possible that many trains remain owned by private ROSCOs, leased to publicly-run operators.

As long as this leasing structure remains, rolling stock ownership stays separate. That means that even with public-ownership of train operation, the asset owners remain private companies — unless a political decision is made to nationalise or buy the rolling-stock portfolios.

If you like, I can pull up a full list of the main ROSCOs and which fleets they own currently (especially those in use by ScotRail and soon-to-be GBR-managed operators). That gives an even clearer breakdown of "who owns which trains".

[b]Ultimately who are the shareholders in these arrangements and are they foreign owned?[/b]

a breakdown of who owns the rolling-stock leasing companies (ROSCOs) that supply trains for ScotRail — and for the operators being folded into Great British Railways (GBR) — plus a look at whether their ownership is foreign, domestic, or mixed.

[b]Who are the main ROSCOs[/b]

Most of the passenger (and many freight) trains in Great Britain — including those used by ScotRail and many other operators — are owned not by the operators themselves but by rolling-stock leasing companies (ROSCOs).

[b]Three ROSCOs dominate the market:[/b]

Angel Trains

Eversholt Rail Group

Porterbrook Leasing Company Ltd ("Porterbrook")

These three historically own the majority of the rolling-stock fleet in Britain.

[b]Who owns these companies (shareholders / parent companies) — and are they foreign?[/b]

Here's who owns the three main ROSCOs today (or in recent years), based on publicly available information:

ROSCO	Major Shareholders / Ownership	Foreign / Domestic / Mixed
Angel Trains	Owned by (as recent shareholding structure) a mix including AMP Capital Investors, PSP Investments (a Canadian public pension-type investment board), and International Public Partnerships (among others).

Mixed — domestic (UK-based investors) and foreign (e.g. Canadian pension fund)
Eversholt Rail Group	Owned by CK Hutchison Holdings / Cheung Kong Infrastructure (a conglomerate based in Hong Kong / Asia).

Foreign (Hong Kong/Asia-based parent company)
Porterbrook	Owned by a consortium of institutional investors including AIMCo (Canadian pension-type investment manager), Allianz Capital Partners (linked to the German insurer/asset-manager), plus other asset-management firms and investors.

Mixed — foreign (Canadian, German, others) and possibly UK-based investors/assets

Some context / important details:

According to official industry data, as of 2017 the three big ROSCOs — Angel, Porterbrook, and Eversholt — between them owned around 87% of the national rolling-stock fleet.

Smaller leasing companies also exist beyond the big three, but these three remain dominant.

Because of this structure, even though day-to-day operations of trains may be managed by public or private operators (or by state-owned entities under GBR), the trains themselves are often owned by private (frequently international) investors.

[b]What this means (especially under GBR / public-ownership reforms)[/b]

Even if train operating companies are taken back into public ownership (as the GBR reforms will do for many), that does not automatically mean the trains themselves become publicly owned. The ROSCOs could remain privately owned, leasing trains to the public operator.

That means a significant portion of UK rail's physical assets are — and may remain — in the hands of foreign and institutional investors, not the state.

For taxpayers and rail users, this raises questions about long-term value, accountability, and whether the government should consider buying out the rolling-stock assets (or creating a public equivalent to ROSCO) as part of a broader "rail nationalisation."

[b]Public Reaction & Debate (some community insight)[/b]

There are active debates — including among rail-enthusiast communities and unions — about whether it makes sense for key rail infrastructure to remain under private, often foreign, ownership. As one user on a UK rail forum put it:

"They were invented to hold the stock and lease them to franchises while maintaining them on their behalf ... now the railways are directly in the hands of civil servants I fear ... but the stock remains leased."

Others argue that leasing allows flexibility — especially given that operators change over time — but critics see it as part of a system that extracts profit from a public service.

[b]Who Gets the Profits[/b]

A breakdown of the most recent publicly available financial and fleet-size information for the main rolling stock-leasing companies (ROSCOs) serving ScotRail and other UK operators — plus what that tells us about who actually owns the trains and how profitable the arrangements are.

Overview - Major ROSCOs & their scope

The primary ROSCOs in the UK — who own most of the passenger trains leased to operators — are:

Angel Trains

Eversholt Rail Group

Porterbrook Leasing Company

These three historically dominate the rolling stock market.

They supply trains to numerous train-operating companies (TOCs), including those taken into public ownership under Great British Railways (GBR), and to operators such as ScotRail.

[b]Recent Financials & Fleet Data for ROSCOs
Angel Trains[/b]

As of the financial year ending 2023, Angel Trains reportedly had group revenue of ~£600.2 million (up from £578.4 million in 2022).

Their 2024-2025 investor report shows they own 3,963 rolling-stock vehicles (as of 30 June 2025). 
Angel Trains

Among those, a minority (81 vehicles) were "off-lease" — i.e. not currently leased out, though most of these are expected to be scrapped or held for spares.

Angel claims to have invested heavily over the years: since privatisation, they have spent billions acquiring new rolling stock and refurbishing existing fleets.

Eversholt Rail Group

As of 30 June 2025, Eversholt's fleet comprises 2,627 passenger vehicles (including electric multiple units (EMUs), bi-mode units, etc.).

From their 2024 financial statement: in 2024 the company generated a profit of £56,823,000 (compared with £7,531,000 in 2023).

Net assets (as of end 2024) were £72,168,000.

Eversholt say their business remains reliant on long-term lease contracts to UK operators and that fleet utilization remains very high.

Porterbrook Leasing Company

Porterbrook recently paid out £80 million in dividends to shareholders in 2023, despite ongoing disruption and fare pressures in the wider rail network.

Their leasing arm reportedly earned considerable profit (the report mentions "leasing arm earned £144 million in profits"). 
The Guardian

This suggests that Porterbrook remains a highly profitable business — even under the financial pressures facing many train operators and the rail industry at large.

[b]What This Tells Us: Value & Profitability of ROSCOs[/b]

The ROSCO model remains very profitable - combined dividends from major ROSCOs in 2022-23 reached £409.7 million — more than triple the previous year.

They continue to own thousands of vehicles — for example, Angel Trains with nearly 4,000, Eversholt with over 2,600 — meaning a large fraction of Britain's passenger rolling stock is in the hands of these leasing companies.

The profitability comes in part because many lease agreements are long-term (often decades), so ROSCOs get stable payments regardless of how well the trains are used.

Even though train-operating companies (or public bodies under GBR) may run services and pay subsidies or fares, a large portion of rail spending goes to lease payments for rolling stock — benefiting the ROSCOs' shareholders, often institutional investors.

This structure explains why critics argue that ROSCOs extract profits with relatively low risk: the cost of buying trains is shifted to private investors, while operations and demand risk remain with operators/government.

[b]What We Still Don't See (or What's Hard to Get)[/b]

ROSCOs publish financial returns, profits, net assets — but detailed breakdowns of valuations (per train or per fleet) are rarely public (because many assets are financed/debt-backed).

As older rolling stock is retired and new trains (e.g. electric, bi-mode, battery-ready) are built, the underlying asset base changes — so the "book value" of fleets fluctuates. Only high-level net-asset and profit/loss data are publicly available.

Leases are often "dry" or “wet” (with maintenance included); depending on the contract, the ROSCO may bear maintenance or the operator may — this changes the cost/risk balance, but those contractual details are usually commercial confidentiality.

[b]What This Means for the Debate About Ownership & Public Interest[/b]

The fact that private — often foreign or institutional — investors own the trains means a significant part of Britain's rail infrastructure remains in private hands, even if operations (via GBR or public operators) are public.

Given the size of dividends and profits, critics argue that ROSCOs represent a “privatised rent-seeking layer” between public transport users/taxpayers and the rail network.

Some propose that if rail operations are public, the leasing companies (or their fleets) should also be nationalised — thus eliminating long-term payments to external shareholders and potentially reducing long-term costs.

[b]Known Lease-Expiry Dates for ScotRail's Trains[/b]

Public documents — especially ScotRail’s published Grant Agreement — offer a partial picture of when different fleets are due to come off-lease. For example, ScotRail’s small fleet of Class 153 “Highland Explorer” units is leased from Angel Trains, with the current agreement running to March 2026 and an option to extend by two years. Angel Trains also leases the Class 156 diesel units, whose main lease ends in March 2027, though an optional extension could push this to December of the same year.

ScotRail’s electric Class 380 fleet — both the 4-car and 3-car variants — is leased from Eversholt Rail and has one of the longest commitments, with agreements stretching all the way to December 2040. Eversholt also owns the Class 334 units that operate on the Airdrie-Bathgate and North Clyde routes; their lease runs until December 2030. The older Class 318 and Class 320 trains, also from Eversholt, are on leases that end in December 2027, although some Class 320s can come off-lease earlier depending on operational need.

Porterbrook is responsible for several key diesel fleets. The widely-used Class 170 Turbostars remain on lease until March 2035. The smaller Class 158 fleet will stay in service under lease until March 2030. Meanwhile, ScotRail’s High-Speed Trains, used on Inter7City routes and leased from Angel Trains, have a primary lease ending in March 2026. However, an “S54 guarantee” — a legal mechanism ensuring fallback access — effectively extends their assured availability until March 2030, provided certain conditions are met.

These dates illustrate just how staggered and varied ScotRail’s rolling-stock commitments are. Some fleets are tied up well into the 2030s, while others face renewal or replacement pressure within the next few years.

[b]Why a Full Public “Lease-Expiry Timetable” Is So Hard to Produce[/b]

Although some lease dates are available through documents like the ScotRail Grant Agreement, pulling together a complete and definitive map of all rolling-stock lease expiries is surprisingly difficult. One major reason is the sheer variety of fleets and owners involved. ScotRail alone operates trains leased from three different ROSCOs, and each class of train has its own contract terms, durations and renewal options. Multiply this across every operator in Britain — including those soon to be reorganised under Great British Railways — and the picture becomes extremely fragmented.

The complexity doesn’t stop there. Rolling-stock leases often contain extension clauses, early-termination rights, or fallback guarantees such as Scotland’s “S54” mechanism. As a result, a date that looks like an expiry on paper may in practice be only a milestone toward renegotiation rather than a hard end-point. The situation is fluid, and many fleets can be extended well beyond their nominal termination date as long as both parties agree.

Commercial sensitivity is another major barrier. While high-level lease dates may occasionally appear in public documents, the financial terms, negotiation details, penalties and break clauses rarely do. When campaigners and journalists use freedom-of-information laws to obtain the details — as has happened with ScotRail’s High-Speed Train arrangements — governments frequently decline to disclose the sensitive parts. This leaves the public with glimpses of the system but not the full contractual landscape.

Fleet changes also complicate tracking. Trains are refurbished, cascaded to new regions, withdrawn, or swapped between operators. Each change can trigger a renegotiation or replacement of leases, resetting the clock in ways not obvious from the outside. As the rail network transitions toward electrification, battery-hybrid trains and decarbonisation targets, the pace of fleet change accelerates, making historic lease patterns even less reliable as a guide to future ones.

Finally, every region in Britain has its own operating arrangements and contractual structures. What is true for ScotRail does not necessarily apply to operators in England or Wales. Because the UK network never developed a centralised, public database of rolling-stock leasing dates, the information ends up scattered across separate contracts, regulatory filings, company prospectuses and occasional published agreements — leading to a patchwork rather than a coherent national picture.

[b]What We Can and Can’t Infer From Lease-Expiry Data[/b]

Even with these limitations, lease-expiry information is still useful. Knowing when major fleets are due to come off-lease helps indicate when governments or operators might face big decisions about whether to renew leases, order new trains, or reconfigure service patterns. For ScotRail, many significant expiries occur between 2030 and 2035, suggesting this decade will be pivotal for modernising the fleet and determining long-term procurement strategies.

However, it’s important not to over-interpret the data. A train’s lease expiring in a given year doesn’t automatically mean withdrawal from service. Extensions are common; fallback guarantees can keep trains in use; and operators may opt to retain a fleet longer than initially expected if it remains reliable and economical. Conversely, some fleets can be replaced earlier than their lease suggests if strategic priorities change.

Lease-expiry data therefore offers a sense of direction, but not a precise timetable. It helps identify when key decisions must be made, but not exactly what those decisions will be.

[b]What This Means in the Context of Great British Railways[/b]

With the UK government restructuring England’s railways under Great British Railways — and with Scotland and Wales pursuing their own models of public oversight — these staggered lease cycles take on new importance. Public ownership of operations does not automatically bring public ownership of the trains. In most cases, the trains will continue to be owned by private leasing companies for years to come, simply because the existing leases run well into the 2030s.

This means that any long-term shift toward publicly owned rolling stock, or a move toward new types of trains for decarbonisation and capacity reasons, will rely on decisions made at key lease-expiry points. For ScotRail in particular, the next decade represents a crucial window in which modernisation plans, financial commitments, and regulatory changes could reshape the fleet for a generation.

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