England's NHS Data Outsourced to a US Spy Tech Firm - Thankfully Not Scotland

6th February 2026

When ordinary families hear about "data platforms" and "analytics contracts," their eyes glaze over. Yet behind the jargon lies a story of sovereignty, secrecy, and surveillance.

Palantir — a US spy‑tech firm co‑founded by billionaire Peter Thiel — has quietly become embedded in Britain's most sensitive systems: from battlefields to hospital wards, from nuclear deterrence to patient records. The timeline of its rise tells us how political influence, corporate ambition, and public trust collided.

Timeline Narrative

2008-2010
During the financial crisis, Jeffrey Epstein maintained influence in finance and politics. UK Cabinet minister Peter Mandelson was accused of leaking "market‑sensitive" government information to Epstein. This period coincided with Epstein's financial partnership with Peter Thiel, Palantir's co‑founder.

2010
Epstein co‑owned a Silicon Valley venture fund with Thiel. At the same time, Palantir was expanding its reach into government contracts worldwide, laying the groundwork for entry into Britain's defence and health systems.

2018-2020
Palantir began to win pilot contracts in the UK, embedding itself in defence and NHS projects. What looked like small‑scale trials were in fact beachheads into critical national infrastructure.

November 2023
NHS England awarded Palantir a £330 million contract to build the Federated Data Platform (FDP). This seven‑year deal gave Palantir control over integrating patient data across hospitals and GP practices. Privacy campaigners warned that a surveillance firm now held the keys to Britain's health records.

September 2025
Palantir announced that Britain would become its European headquarters for defence, promising up to £1.5 billion investment and 350 jobs. The symbolism was clear: the UK was now Palantir’s European base of operations.

2026-2029
The Ministry of Defence signed a £240.6 million contract with Palantir to provide enterprise data analytics for military decision‑making. This entrenched Palantir at the heart of Britain’s defence infrastructure.

Ongoing
Mandelson remains under investigation for misconduct in public office linked to Epstein. The overlap of Epstein’s ties to Thiel and Mandelson’s alleged leaks to Epstein casts a shadow over Palantir’s rapid rise in UK government contracts.

Scotland’s Position[/b[
It is crucial to note that the £330 million NHS contract applies only to NHS England. Scotland’s NHS, under devolved control, runs its own digital health strategy and has not adopted Palantir’s Federated Data Platform. Wales and Northern Ireland likewise operate separately. England’s choice to outsource health data to a US surveillance firm stands in stark contrast to Scotland’s decision to retain control of its own systems.

[b]Risks and Implications
National Security: Defence and nuclear contracts mean Britain’s military decisions rely on Palantir’s software.

Data Sovereignty
NHS England’s patient records are managed by a US firm with roots in surveillance and intelligence.

Political Influence
Epstein’s financial ties to Thiel and Mandelson’s alleged leaks to Epstein raise questions about how Palantir gained such deep access.

Public Trust
Families may fear their health data is vulnerable, undermining confidence in NHS reforms.

From the financial crisis to the present day, Palantir’s rise in Britain has been shadowed by political scandal and sovereignty concerns. What began with Epstein’s partnership with Thiel and Mandelson’s alleged leaks has ended with Palantir controlling vast swathes of UK defence and health infrastructure.

The story is not just about contracts and platforms it is about who holds power over the nation’s most sensitive information.

Why Faith in Palantir’s Contracts Is Shaky

Trust is the currency of public life. When governments sign billion‑pound contracts with private firms, citizens expect transparency, accountability, and safety. Yet in the case of Palantir the US surveillance‑tech company now embedded in Britain’s defence and health systems — faith in these contracts is fragile.

Secrecy in procurement, political shadows from the Epstein-Mandelson scandal, and the sheer scale of Palantir’s control over sensitive data all call into question whether these arrangements are truly safe.

Secrecy in Procurement
Palantir’s contracts with the Ministry of Defence and NHS England were often awarded without open competition, justified under "national security" exemptions. This means ordinary citizens, MPs, and watchdogs have little visibility into why Palantir was chosen or whether alternatives were considered. When deals worth hundreds of millions are signed behind closed doors, trust inevitably erodes.

Political Shadows
The revelations about Peter Mandelson’s alleged leaks of UK government information to Jeffrey Epstein, combined with Epstein’s financial partnership with Palantir’s co‑founder Peter Thiel, cast a long shadow. Even if Palantir’s contracts were technically above board, the overlap of scandal and procurement undermines confidence. Citizens are left wondering: was Palantir’s rise in Britain purely merit‑based, or greased by influence and secrecy?

National Security Risks
Palantir’s defence contracts embed its software in Britain’s military decision‑making. Critics warn this creates a "gaping national security vulnerability" if a US surveillance firm controls critical UK systems. Sovereignty is at stake: can Britain truly claim independent defence capability if its data backbone is outsourced to a foreign company?

Public Trust in Health Data
The £330 million Federated Data Platform contract with NHS England hands Palantir control of patient data integration. Families rightly ask: why should a company known for surveillance and immigration enforcement hold the keys to our health records? Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have kept Palantir out of their health systems, showing that alternatives exist. England’s choice looks increasingly isolated and politically driven rather than citizen‑focused.

Transparency Gap
The combination of secrecy, political scandal, and foreign control leaves citizens in the dark. Contracts of this magnitude should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and public debate. Instead, they were signed quietly, with little explanation. That gap between government decisions and public understanding is where trust collapses.

Faith in Palantir’s contracts is shaky because the foundations are weak. A raft of issues is clear covering secrecy in procurement, political entanglements, national security risks, and public distrust in health data management. The question is not whether Palantir’s technology works as it clearly does but whether Britain can afford to outsource its most sensitive systems to a company born of surveillance, shadowed by scandal, and shielded from scrutiny.