19th May 2026
At the moment, rationing of petrol and diesel in the UK or most Western countries is still considered a last-resort scenario rather than something imminent. But the risk has clearly risen because the oil market is now relying heavily on emergency reserves rather than normal supply flows.
The key issue is not that the world is “running out” of oil physically. The problem is whether enough oil can be transported and refined quickly enough if the disruption around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz continues.
The International Energy Agency has already coordinated the largest emergency stock release in history — 400 million barrels from strategic reserves. Reuters reported today that IEA chief Fatih Birol warned commercial inventories are “depleting rapidly” and that only “a few weeks” of commercial stocks remain at current drawdown rates.
However, that does not mean motorists only have “a few weeks of petrol left.” There are several layers of buffers:
Commercial inventories held by refiners and fuel distributors
Government strategic reserves
Demand reduction from high prices
Emergency conservation measures
Fuel import substitution where possible
Most IEA countries are legally supposed to hold the equivalent of at least 90 days of net oil imports in reserve.
So what happens next depends mainly on how long the Middle East disruption lasts.
Scenario 1: Conflict eases within weeks
If tanker traffic through Hormuz partially resumes and oil exports recover during summer, rationing is unlikely. Prices may remain very high, but governments would probably rely on:
continued reserve releases,
voluntary fuel saving,
and reduced industrial demand.
In this scenario you would more likely see:
very expensive fuel,
shortages in isolated regions,
and queues at petrol stations,
rather than formal rationing.
Scenario 2: Severe disruption lasts 2–4 months
This is where governments begin considering emergency controls.
The world has already burned through a very large amount of reserve oil in only a couple of months. Global inventories fell by a record 246 million barrels in March and April alone, according to the IEA.
If:
Hormuz remained effectively blocked,
Iranian production stayed offline,
Gulf exports were heavily disrupted,
and reserves kept being drawn down at current speed,
then by late summer or early autumn governments could begin introducing “soft rationing” measures such as:
priority fuel access for emergency services,
restrictions on non-essential government travel,
reduced motorway speed limits,
odd/even number plate filling systems,
fuel purchase limits,
work-from-home mandates,
or temporary bans on certain fuel-intensive activities.
That would probably happen before full wartime-style ration books.
Scenario 3: Major escalation lasting 6+ months
If the crisis became prolonged and reserves approached exhaustion, then formal rationing becomes much more realistic.
At that point governments would prioritise:
Food supply chains
Emergency services
Freight and logistics
Agriculture
Power generation
Public transport
Private car use would move much lower down the priority list.
Diesel would likely become the biggest concern before petrol because modern economies depend on diesel for:
trucks,
farming,
construction,
shipping,
backup generators,
and industry.
In a real shortage, governments usually protect diesel first and allow petrol demand to collapse naturally through price rises.
The UK specifically is in a slightly better position than many countries because:
North Sea production still exists,
Britain imports from multiple regions,
fuel demand has fallen over decades,
and EV adoption has reduced some petrol demand.
But the UK is still heavily dependent on global refined fuel markets and does not have enormous standalone reserves compared with major powers like the US or China.
China meanwhile appears to have accumulated extremely large strategic stocks over recent years, possibly now the world’s largest. That gives Beijing more room to cushion domestic shortages than many Western economies.
The important thing to watch now is not just oil prices, but:
diesel crack spreads,
refinery shutdowns,
tanker insurance costs,
and whether the IEA announces another coordinated reserve release.
If reserve releases accelerate again over the next few weeks, that would suggest governments are becoming genuinely worried about physical shortages rather than simply high prices.
Ukraine Russia Affects
The Russia–Ukraine war is still a major factor in the global oil situation, even though most attention has shifted toward Iran and the Middle East.
Ukraine has increasingly targeted Russian oil infrastructure with long-range drone strikes, while Russia has attacked Ukrainian energy facilities and export infrastructure. The cumulative effect is to reduce spare capacity and make the whole global oil system much more fragile.
Ukraine has struck:
refineries,
fuel depots,
export terminals,
pumping stations,
and occasionally pipeline infrastructure inside Russia.
Reuters estimated earlier this year that Ukrainian drone attacks had temporarily disrupted around 15–20% of Russian refining capacity at various points.
Russia is still exporting large amounts of crude oil, especially to China and India, but refinery outages matter because they reduce supplies of:
diesel,
aviation fuel,
gasoline,
and other refined products.
Diesel is particularly important because Europe used to rely heavily on Russian diesel before sanctions and the war disrupted flows.
Meanwhile Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid also matter because they:
increase European energy insecurity,
force more competition for global fuel supplies,
and keep energy prices structurally elevated.
The bigger issue now is that the world has lost much of its “shock absorber.”
Before:
Russia exported freely,
OPEC had spare capacity,
strategic reserves were fuller,
and tanker routes were relatively secure.
Now the system is under pressure from multiple directions at once:
Russian infrastructure attacks,
Middle East conflict risks,
Red Sea shipping disruptions,
sanctions,
refinery bottlenecks,
and falling inventories.
That means even relatively small disruptions now have outsized price effects.
For example:
A refinery fire in Russia,
a tanker attack near Hormuz,
or a pipeline shutdown in Libya
can now move oil prices sharply because traders know there is less spare capacity available globally.
Russia itself remains one of the world’s largest oil exporters. Russia exported roughly 7–8 million barrels per day of crude and petroleum products before the latest escalations. Even partial disruption matters enormously to world markets.
The strange situation is that Russian crude production has held up better than many expected because:
China and India kept buying,
Russia assembled a “shadow tanker fleet,”
and discounted Russian oil continued flowing outside Western systems.
But this has come at a cost:
longer shipping routes,
higher insurance costs,
inefficient logistics,
and greater vulnerability to attacks and sanctions.
All of this contributes to why oil prices are behaving in a “yo-yo” fashion:
markets fear catastrophic shortages,
then prices pull back when demand weakens or no immediate disruption appears,
then spike again after another attack or escalation.
The strategic reserve issue makes this more serious because governments have already used large amounts of emergency stockpiles to stabilize prices. That leaves less room to respond if:
Russian exports fall sharply,
and Middle East supplies are disrupted simultaneously.
That combination is the real nightmare scenario for energy markets.
In practical terms, Russia–Ukraine alone probably would not cause fuel rationing in Britain. The world has adapted somewhat to those disruptions over the past few years.
But combined with:
prolonged Hormuz disruption,
heavy reserve depletion,
and further refinery attacks,
the cumulative stress could push some countries toward emergency fuel controls later in 2026.