31st August 2026
There was something almost nostalgic about the Ministry of Defence announcement this week that British troops are to trial a new powered paraglider which could give them an innovative way to strike from the sky.
The machine, called Blakcro, can apparently be carried in a large rucksack, assembled in less than eight minutes and operated without a runway or conventional aircraft. The MOD says its low acoustic, visual and radar signature could allow troops to approach an objective with a degree of stealth that would be difficult to achieve using conventional aircraft.
On paper, it sounds clever and perhaps it is but there is one rather large question which ought to be asked before anyone gets too enthusiastic.
Has the battlefield changed faster than the technology?
The experience of Ukraine has demonstrated that the airspace immediately above a battlefield has become an extraordinarily dangerous place for anything that can be detected.
Drones are no longer simply reconnaissance gadgets. They observe, identify, track and attack. Some are relatively cheap and expendable. Others carry sophisticated sensors or are designed specifically to destroy targets.
The British Government itself has acknowledged just how profound this change has been.
A Defence Minister told the London Defence Conference earlier this year that drones now account for the largest proportion of battlefield effects in Ukraine and that relatively cheap systems are capable of destroying much more expensive targets. The Government has also said that the Ukrainian battlefield is demonstrating how rapidly warfare is changing, with innovation cycles being measured in weeks rather than years.
That is an extraordinary admission and it raises questions about the paraglider.
The MOD's argument is understandable. A powered paraglider is relatively simple, portable and potentially difficult to detect. It could allow specialist troops to reach places which might otherwise require a helicopter, aircraft or other conspicuous means of transport.
There may well be circumstances in which that is extremely useful.
But there is a difference between being difficult to detect and being invisible.
A soldier suspended beneath a paraglider remains a person in the air.
And once detected, the question becomes what protection that person has.
A conventional helicopter is vulnerable to enemy weapons, but it at least has speed, manoeuvrability, communications, defensive systems and the ability to operate with other aircraft and ground forces.
A paraglider is something rather different as it is slow and relatively exposed.
Its ability to change direction rapidly is limited.
And the person flying it is not sitting inside an armoured vehicle.
That does not necessarily make the idea wrong. It means the circumstances in which it could safely be used may be considerably narrower than the headline announcement might suggest.
The MOD is not ignoring this wider problem. Quite the opposite.
Britain is investing billions in drones and autonomous systems and has explicitly identified counter-drone technology as a priority. The Strategic Defence Review called for investment in attack and surveillance drones alongside counter-drone systems, while the Government announced in June that more than £5 billion would be invested in a major transformation of UK military drone capability over the following four years.
Britain is also developing increasingly sophisticated ways of defeating drones.
It has been testing high-speed interceptor drones, electronic warfare systems and other counter-UAS technologies. The UK has even deployed a new lower-cost anti-drone weapon in the Middle East.
So we have an interesting paradox.
Britain is effectively saying that drones have transformed warfare and that the military needs to invest heavily in protecting troops from them.
At the same time, it is experimenting with putting soldiers into the air on a machine which, however cleverly designed, cannot simply remove the fundamental vulnerability of a human being flying through contested airspace.
Perhaps the answer is that the paraglider is not intended for the sort of battlefield we normally imagine.
It could be particularly useful for specialised missions where surprise, distance and access matter more than speed. A small team could potentially move without the noise and logistical requirements associated with a helicopter. It might be useful for infiltration, reconnaissance or particular types of operation where the enemy's surveillance capability is limited.
That is a very different proposition from sending paraglider troops across a battlefield dominated by drones.
And that distinction matters.
One of the biggest lessons from Ukraine is that technology cannot be considered in isolation. A piece of equipment which looks ingenious in a demonstration can become much less useful once an opponent adapts.
The speed of that adaptation is one of the most important lessons of the war.
A drone is developed.
The enemy finds a way to jam it.
The drone is modified.
The enemy changes its electronic warfare system.
A new sensor appears.
A new countermeasure follows.
The cycle continues.
The British Government has recognised this. Its defence cooperation with Ukraine specifically includes exchanging battlefield lessons and developing unmanned systems, counter-drone technology, electronic warfare and air defence.
That should include asking uncomfortable questions about every new system Britain proposes to put in the hands of its soldiers.
The issue is not whether a powered paraglider is a good invention.
It may be.
The issue is whether it remains a good invention when the other side has drones looking for it.
There is also a broader lesson here for defence procurement.
Military equipment traditionally took years to design, test and introduce. The modern battlefield is increasingly moving at a much faster pace.
If a new system takes five or ten years to develop, there is a danger that the threat it was designed to address will have changed considerably by the time it reaches frontline troops.
That means the ability to adapt may now be just as important as the original design.
A £100 million weapons programme that becomes obsolete may be less useful than a collection of cheaper systems which can be rapidly modified as circumstances change.
The same principle applies to the protection of soldiers.
Perhaps the future is not about finding one perfect vehicle, aircraft or weapon.
Perhaps it is about combining many technologies so that a soldier is not relying on any one of them to keep him or her alive.
Surveillance drones could identify threats.
Other drones could provide decoys.
Electronic warfare could interfere with enemy systems.
Counter-drone weapons could protect the route.
And conventional aircraft and ground forces could provide additional support.
In that environment, a powered paraglider might have a role.
Without those layers of protection, the calculation could look very different.
There is another uncomfortable point.
The cost of a drone capable of finding or attacking a target can be tiny compared with the cost of training the highly skilled soldier who is being exposed to it.
That changes the economics of warfare.
If an enemy can spend a few thousand pounds to threaten a soldier whose training has cost the taxpayer hundreds of thousands, the incentive to develop ever better drones is obvious.
This is why the Government is now investing so heavily in autonomous systems and counter-drone technology. It is not simply a technological fashion. It is an attempt to respond to a fundamental change in the economics of the battlefield.
So I would not dismiss the British paraglider.
Nor would I celebrate it simply because it looks innovative.
The right question is more basic:
In what circumstances would a British soldier be safer travelling through the air in this machine than by any other available method?
If the MOD has a convincing answer, then the technology may have a valuable future.
If the answer depends upon the enemy not seeing it, not having drones in the area or not being able to respond quickly enough, then the Ukraine experience should make everyone pause.
The extraordinary thing about modern warfare is that yesterday's science fiction can become today's battlefield technology almost overnight.
But the reverse can also happen.
Yesterday's clever solution can become tomorrow's liability.
Britain has rightly been studying Ukraine and investing heavily in drones, counter-drone systems and rapid technological development.
The challenge now is to make sure that every new piece of equipment is judged against the battlefield that actually exists, rather than the battlefield that existed when the idea was first conceived.
Because the greatest danger facing a soldier may not be that the enemy has better technology.
It may be that we have not changed our technology quickly enough.
Anyone remember James Bond and his mini copter that came in a bag ready for assembly.
The full UK Government announcement
New paraglider could give British troops an innovative way to strike from the sky
A MOD-backed UK start-up has developed the UK's first foot-launched military paraglider, which can take off with no runway, helicopter or drop aircraft required.
UK’s first foot-launched military paraglider systems could give British troops the freedom to take to the skies independently, with no runway, helicopter or drop aircraft required.
The gliders can be assembled in under eight minutes, in darkness, and are capable of travelling up to 200 miles on their own power.
British start-up Blakcro expands workforce with MOD support, showing defence is an engine for growth.
British soldiers could be equipped with rucksack-sized powered paragliders for covert missions in hostile territory, following a new invention by a UK start-up this year.
Backed by around £6 million from the Ministry of Defence (MOD), British start-up Blakcro has developed the UK’s first foot-launched military paraglider systems. A pilot can launch the system by running, powered only by their own legs and the glider’s engine. The gliders will enable troops to fly covertly into hostile territory without a runway, helicopter or drop aircraft.
Supported by UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) – the MOD’s ‘front door’ for companies that have not previously worked with defence – Wiltshire-based Blakcro has designed the unique gliders specifically for military use, with the company supplying systems this year and into 2027.
The glider folds into a case approximately the size of a large rucksack and can be assembled in under eight minutes in complete darkness, with a low acoustic, visual and radar signature designed to support stealth insertions into hostile territory.
Built around a UK-made titanium airframe, the glider can travel up to 200 miles under its own power, and accommodates body armour, night vision equipment and weapon mounts. The technology is already in operational use, with contracts held across the UK and with NATO allies. The Royal Marines and Parachute Regiment are now looking to trial this individual approach to air mobility in the coming months.
Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Luke Pollard MP, said:
With UK Defence Innovation supporting SMEs like Blakcro from the drawing board through to deployment, we are building a more resilient, homegrown defence supply chain and ensuring our armed forces receive the pioneering equipment that can give them the edge on the battlefield.
Defence has a new way of working with industry, backing British innovation to deliver cutting-edge capability for our armed forces and good jobs in regions like Wiltshire.
Blakcro first engaged with UKDI, part of MOD’s National Armaments Director Group, through its Open Call for Innovation and has since received support across two other projects. One such project has received a Defence Innovation Loan, enabling the company to scale from a single product to full production.
Blakcro’s growth reflects the wider ambition of UKDI to strengthen the UK’s sovereign defence supply chain. Since receiving UKDI support, the company has grown from 3 to 11 employees and now holds 3 prime contracts with the UK and with NATO allies.
Sam Wedgwood, Founder and Chief Executive Officer at Blakcro, said:
From a UKDI success story perspective, we have very rapidly moved from base technology in 2024, through UKDI-supported rapid innovation, through to purchase, through to operational use by 2026. We could not have done that at this pace without the support we have received – not just the funding, but the commercialisation support and the access to the right people. UKDI kept telling us we were special. I think it’s mutual.
The partnership between Blakcro and UKDI is an example of the government backing agile, homegrown innovators to deliver cutting-edge military capability and sustainable growth, strengthening the UK’s defence industrial base while keeping our armed forces ahead of emerging threats.