Dodgy Vape Shops and Why Is It Taking So Long to Shut Down Businesses Linked to Organised Crime?

4th September 2026

Walk down some British high streets and it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore a rather uncomfortable question.

Who actually owns some of these shops?

The brightly lit premises selling disposable vapes, nicotine products, imported cigarettes, sweets and a bewildering assortment of other goods can look perfectly ordinary. Some are perfectly legitimate businesses.

But behind some of them, according to evidence gathered by law-enforcement and Trading Standards organisations, is something considerably more serious.

Organised crime.

This is no longer simply a question about whether somebody is selling a vape that does not comply with the regulations. The growing concern is that some apparently ordinary retail premises are being used to sell illicit tobacco and vapes, evade tax, launder criminal money, employ people illegally and provide a respectable-looking front for much wider criminal activity.

The question is why the authorities appear to be moving so slowly when they know this is happening.

This isn't about legitimate vape shops

That distinction is important.

There are legitimate businesses selling legal vaping products and complying with the rules. They should not be treated as criminals simply because they happen to sell vapes.

The problem is the growing evidence of businesses that repeatedly break the law or are connected to organised criminal networks.

A 2026 House of Commons Library briefing found that organised crime groups are involved in illicit tobacco and vape trading. It also reported that 97% of Trading Standards professionals surveyed were aware of suspected organised crime groups operating from retail premises.

The briefing estimated that at least £1 billion of criminal cash is laundered through high-street stores every year.

That should stop us thinking about the problem as simply a few dodgy products sitting behind a counter.

This is potentially a high-street organised-crime problem.

The money involved is enormous

Illegal vapes and tobacco are attractive to criminals for a very simple reason.

There is money to be made.

A legitimate retailer has to pay tax, comply with product regulations, employ staff legally, pay rent, business rates and other costs.

The criminal competitor can potentially ignore many of those costs.

Illegal tobacco can be imported or manufactured cheaply and sold at prices that legitimate retailers cannot match.

Illegal vapes can be sold in large quantities without complying with the same rules governing legal products.

And because the goods are small, easily transported and have a high value relative to their physical size, they are particularly attractive to organised criminals.

The profits can then be used for other criminal activities or fed back into apparently legitimate businesses.

That is where the high-street shop becomes important.

A shop gives criminal money a respectable-looking home.

Why not simply close the shop?

This sounds like the obvious solution.

If a premises is repeatedly caught selling illegal products, why not shut it down?

The reality is more complicated because the authorities have to operate within the law.

A shop cannot simply be closed permanently because an officer suspects its owner is involved in criminal activity.

Evidence has to be gathered.

People have legal rights.

Businesses can challenge enforcement decisions.

Different offences fall under different legislation and different agencies.

That is entirely reasonable.

But there is a danger of allowing the need for perfect evidence against an individual criminal to become an excuse for allowing a clearly problematic business to continue operating indefinitely.

The Government itself now appears to recognise the problem.

In England and Wales, it has announced new measures to make it easier to close high-street premises linked to organised crime and extend closure periods to as long as 12 months.

A new High Street Organised Crime Unit is also being established as part of a £30 million national crackdown.

That is welcome.

But it raises another question.

Why has it taken so long?

Britain has already had plenty of warnings

This problem did not suddenly appear in 2026.

Trading Standards officers have been warning for years about the growth of illegal tobacco and vaping products.

The products are increasingly visible.

The financial incentives are obvious.

And the connection with organised crime has been repeatedly identified.

Yet enforcement is still often fragmented.

Trading Standards may identify the illegal products.

HMRC may be interested in the tax evasion.

Police may be interested in organised crime or money laundering.

Immigration enforcement may discover illegal working.

Local authorities may have information about licensing, premises or business activity.

Each agency can have a piece of the puzzle.

The criminals, meanwhile, see the whole picture.

That is one of the biggest weaknesses in the current system.

Scotland faces exactly the same problem

This isn't just an English high-street issue.

Police Scotland, HMRC and Trading Standards have already been working together on operations targeting businesses suspected of involvement in illegal activity.

In one recent operation, officers visited 40 Scottish businesses, including vape shops, as part of a crackdown involving organised immigration crime.

Four premises were found without the necessary licence to sell alcohol or tobacco.

That is significant because it demonstrates the value of agencies working together.

One visit can potentially uncover several different offences.

The Scottish Government also operates a Register of Tobacco and Vaping Product Retailers.

That means there is already a basic piece of information available to enforcement agencies: who is actually registered to sell these products.

From October 2026, the penalties for failing to register are being strengthened, including fines and the possibility of being banned from selling tobacco or vaping products for up to two years.

So the information and enforcement powers are growing.

The question is whether they are being used aggressively enough.

Why should a shop be allowed to become a criminal cash machine?

This is where the argument becomes much bigger than vaping.

Imagine a shop that is repeatedly found selling illegal tobacco.

Then illegal vapes.

Then counterfeit goods.

Then investigators discover suspicious employment practices.

Then there are questions about where the money going through the business actually comes from.

Each individual offence may be dealt with separately.

But taken together, they could paint a very different picture.

The business may not really be a normal retail operation at all.

It may be part of a criminal network.

That is why enforcement agencies need to be looking beyond the individual packet of illegal tobacco or box of vapes.

They need to follow the money.

Who owns the company?

Who owns the premises?

Where did the money to establish the business come from?

Who supplies the products?

Where do the takings go?

Are the employees properly employed?

Are taxes being paid?

Are there links with other businesses?

Are the same people appearing behind multiple shops?

Those questions can reveal the organisation behind the shop.

The taxman has a particularly important role

This is where HMRC comes into the picture.

A business selling apparently large volumes of goods but declaring surprisingly little taxable profit should attract attention.

So should businesses with complicated ownership structures, unexplained cash flows or substantial cash transactions that do not appear consistent with their declared business.

HMRC has announced plans for more than 30,000 high-street interventions during 2026–27, targeting activities including tax evasion, money laundering and illicit goods.

That is a substantial increase in enforcement activity.

But the public will reasonably ask what happens after the intervention.

Does somebody actually lose their business?

Are the assets seized?

Does the company disappear only for another company to open at the same premises?

Are the people behind the operation prosecuted?

Or does the same activity simply continue under a different name?

The high street should not become a safe place for organised crime

There is also a wider social issue.

A legitimate shopkeeper has to comply with the rules.

They pay tax.

They employ people legally.

They buy their stock through legitimate suppliers.

They have insurance.

They pay rent.

They compete against other businesses on relatively equal terms.

Then another shop opens nearby and sells illegal products at prices that legitimate retailers cannot compete with.

That isn't just a policing problem.

It is unfair competition.

Every pound spent on illegal goods is potentially a pound not spent with a legitimate business.

And if the illegal business is also being used to launder money, the legitimate retailer is effectively competing against criminal capital.

That is not a level playing field.

There is a particularly worrying effect on young people

The vaping issue itself cannot be ignored.

Illegal and non-compliant products can potentially bypass the safeguards imposed on legitimate products.

That can include restrictions relating to nicotine strength, ingredients, packaging and the sale of products to under-age customers.

The growth of brightly coloured, sweet-flavoured and sometimes apparently child-oriented products has already caused widespread concern.

But there is an even more basic issue.

If a shop is prepared to ignore one set of laws, why should we assume it will be particularly concerned about another?

A business that knowingly sells illegal products is already demonstrating that profit comes before compliance.

That is precisely why the authorities need to distinguish between legitimate retailers and those operating outside the law.

Closing the premises may be more effective than chasing every product

There is a potentially powerful enforcement principle here.

Instead of repeatedly confiscating illegal stock, target the business infrastructure that makes the operation possible.

If the premises is repeatedly being used for criminal activity, close it.

If the business is being used to launder money, seize criminal assets where the law allows.

If the owner cannot explain the source of the money used to establish the operation, investigate it.

If the same individuals keep appearing behind supposedly unrelated businesses, connect the intelligence.

And if one shop closes only for another business with the same people behind it to appear next door, follow the people rather than simply the company name.

That is how you start dismantling an organised network rather than playing an endless game of confiscate and reopen.

But there is a danger in going too far

There is one important warning.

We should not create a system where a legitimate business can be closed simply because an enforcement officer does not like its appearance, because its owners come from overseas, or because it sells products that some people dislike.

That would be completely wrong.

The answer is not arbitrary closure.

It is intelligence-led enforcement based on evidence.

Where there is evidence of serious and repeated criminal activity, however, the response should be swift.

The public should not have to watch the same premises being raided again and again while the business simply reopens.

Scotland should be asking some uncomfortable questions

For Scotland, there is an obvious opportunity.

The Scottish Government and Police Scotland should be able to identify every registered tobacco and vaping retailer.

They should also have intelligence from Trading Standards, HMRC, police investigations, licensing authorities and other agencies.

So why not create a coordinated system that identifies the businesses presenting the greatest risk?

A retailer with no history of problems should not be treated like one repeatedly caught selling illegal products.

But a retailer repeatedly appearing in enforcement operations should receive much greater scrutiny.

That is not unfair.

It is targeted enforcement.

And if the evidence points towards organised crime, the investigation should move beyond the shopkeeper and towards the people financing, supplying and controlling the operation.

The Government needs to decide what it wants the high street to be

Britain's high streets already face enough problems.

Empty shops, rising costs, online competition and declining footfall are putting legitimate businesses under pressure.

The last thing they need is to compete against criminal enterprises with access to untaxed goods and illicit money.

The Government's new £30 million crackdown and High Street Organised Crime Unit are therefore welcome developments.

But money and announcements are not enough.

People will judge the policy by what happens on the ground.

Do the worst premises actually close?

Do the people behind them lose their assets?

Do illegal operators stay out after enforcement?

Do legitimate retailers see a reduction in unfair competition?

And do communities feel that their high streets are being taken back from organised crime?

Those are the measures that matter.

The problem is no longer just about vaping.

It is about whether Britain is prepared to allow criminal organisations to establish themselves behind ordinary-looking shop fronts and make substantial profits while legitimate businesses struggle to survive.

The authorities now have more information, more cooperation between agencies and stronger powers than they had before.

There is therefore little excuse for simply carrying on with a cycle of raids, confiscations and warnings.

If a shop is genuinely being used as a vehicle for organised criminal activity, the objective should not be to take away this week's illegal vapes.

The objective should be to shut down the criminal business behind them. The Government needs to act faster.