16th October 2026
The interruption of military-grade satellite communications used by Ukraine has exposed a weakness in Western defence planning. Modern armies increasingly depend on commercial satellite networks, but what happens when the company operating them, or the government controlling access, decides that the service must be restricted?
The recent disruption involving Starlink and its military counterpart, Starshield, has brought that question into sharp focus. Ukraine's forces have relied heavily on satellite communications for battlefield coordination, drone operations and the transmission of information between units. Although access has since been restored, the episode has highlighted the risks of depending on technology that Ukraine does not control.
The immediate problem may have passed, but the strategic question remains. Does Europe have alternatives, and could Britain help provide them?
Europe has an alternative, but not a complete replacement
One of the most important alternatives is OneWeb, now part of the European satellite operator Eutelsat. Britain played a major role in rescuing OneWeb in 2020, investing $500 million alongside Indian investor Bharti Global. The network has since become an important part of the market for satellite broadband, serving governments, businesses, telecommunications operators and other customers.
OneWeb uses satellites in low Earth orbit, similar in principle to Starlink. Its services can provide relatively low-latency connections, making them useful for applications that require information to move quickly between users.
The UK Government retains a stake in Eutelsat and has identified the investment as important for national security, communications resilience and cooperation with France.
However, OneWeb is not simply Starlink under another name. The networks differ in scale, technology, terminals and how services are delivered. Replacing the thousands of terminals already used by Ukrainian forces would take time, while military operations require dependable coverage, secure communications and resistance to jamming.
OneWeb could help diversify Ukraine's communications, but it cannot immediately reproduce every capability currently supplied through American systems.
The European Union plans something bigger
The European Union is developing IRIS², a secure satellite communications system intended to serve governments, defence forces, emergency services and commercial users.
The project reflects a wider European ambition: to have communications infrastructure that European governments can rely on without being entirely dependent on decisions taken in Washington.
IRIS² is still being developed, with its first phase of launches scheduled for the end of 2029. It therefore offers a potential longer-term answer rather than an immediate solution to Ukraine's present needs.
There are practical difficulties too. Building a constellation of satellites is only one part of the task. The system also needs ground infrastructure, secure software, compatible user terminals and arrangements that allow military forces to communicate across national boundaries.
Europe must also decide how the network will be funded, managed and made available during a crisis. A satellite system that works well commercially is not automatically ready to support a war.
China is also building competing networks
Europe and America are not alone in recognising the strategic importance of satellite communications.
China is developing Guowang, a state-backed satellite broadband network, and Qianfan, a separate commercial constellation. Both are intended to provide extensive communications coverage, although they remain at different stages of deployment.
These programmes demonstrate that satellite broadband is becoming an important part of the competition between major powers.
For Ukraine and NATO countries, Chinese networks are not straightforward substitutes because of security, political and military considerations. Nevertheless, their development shows that the future market will not necessarily be dominated by a single American provider.
Canada's Telesat is also developing its Lightspeed network, aimed at commercial, government and defence customers. It could provide another option for Western countries as its system develops.
The emerging picture is one of several competing networks, with different levels of coverage, security and military capability.
Britain has more at stake than it might appear
Britain is not starting from scratch. In addition to its investment in OneWeb, the UK operates Skynet, its established military satellite communications system, and works with allies on secure communications.
The Government's published UK Space Strategy, released in September 2026, commits £2.8 billion to satellite communications between 2026–27 and 2029–30. That includes £2.3 billion for military satellite communications and funding for research and development and public-service connectivity.
These commitments underline that satellite communications are already considered a defence and national resilience priority. The challenge is ensuring that investment provides sufficient diversity and independence, rather than simply extending existing arrangements.
Britain also has an opportunity to work more closely with France and other European partners. A shared network could spread the cost of development, provide a larger customer base and make it easier for allied forces to operate together.
However, European cooperation will require agreement on funding, security, access and control. Governments may be reluctant to surrender authority over systems they consider essential to national defence.
The problem is not just satellites
It would be a mistake to assume that buying access to a second satellite network automatically solves the problem.
Military communications depend on a chain of technology. Satellites need ground stations, terminals, software, encryption and trained operators. Connections must continue to function when equipment is damaged, signals are jammed or networks are under cyberattack.
There is also a question of political control. A network might be owned by a European company but still depend on foreign technology or suppliers. True resilience requires understanding those dependencies and ensuring that alternatives can operate when they are needed most.
For Ukraine, the challenge is especially urgent because changing networks during an active war could disrupt operations. For Britain, the lesson is to prepare alternatives before a crisis occurs, not after a critical service has been interrupted.
A lesson for Britain's future security
The Starlink episode illustrates a wider change in modern warfare. Commercial technology companies now provide services that can have consequences once associated almost exclusively with governments and armed forces.
That can be an advantage. Private companies can develop and deploy technology more quickly than traditional defence procurement programmes. But it also creates a dependency that governments cannot ignore.
The question is not whether Britain should abandon American technology. American satellite services remain important, and cooperation with the United States continues to provide substantial military benefits.
The question is whether Britain and Europe should have sufficient independent capacity to continue operating if access to those services is restricted, interrupted or withdrawn.
That requires more than announcing a new satellite programme. It means investing in several compatible systems, developing secure terminals and ground infrastructure, and testing whether forces can switch between networks under pressure.
The cost will be considerable. But so could the consequences of discovering, during a future conflict, that a vital communications link depends on a decision taken by another government.
The central lesson is straightforward: a country does not have complete control over its defence if a critical part of that defence depends on communications it cannot guarantee. Britain and Europe have begun building alternatives. The question now is whether they can develop them quickly enough to turn strategic ambition into practical security.