26th October 2026
The decision by Ukraine to explore its own satellite communications system with Finnish companies Nokia and ICEYE may prove to be about much more than finding an alternative to Elon Musk’s Starlink network. It could become part of a wider movement to reduce Europe’s dependence on American technology at a time when international relationships, defence and economic security are under increasing scrutiny.
On 22 October, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence signed a letter of intent with Nokia and ICEYE to explore cooperation on sovereign satellite communications. The aim is to develop a system that Ukraine could own and control, including its satellites, ground infrastructure and user terminals. No final purchase contract, funding commitment or deployment schedule has yet been announced. Source: Nokia and ICEYE.
The timing is significant. Earlier in October, Nokia and ICEYE had already announced their partnership to develop secure satellite broadband systems for governments, defence forces and emergency services. The first communications satellites are expected to launch in 2028.
The project was therefore not created solely in response to the latest difficulties surrounding Starlink. However, Ukraine’s experience has provided a powerful illustration of why countries want communications infrastructure they can control themselves.
The Starlink lesson
Starlink has become an important part of Ukraine’s communications infrastructure during its war with Russia. Its satellites can connect military personnel and equipment where conventional networks have been damaged or destroyed. Communications can be vital to coordinating forces, sharing intelligence and operating drones.
But Starlink is a commercial service operated by an American company. Ukraine does not own the constellation and cannot make all the decisions about how it is operated.
That creates an uncomfortable strategic question. What happens when a country depends on a privately controlled foreign system during a war, but the operator’s decisions, commercial interests or government relationships do not coincide with its own priorities?
The point is not that Starlink has no value. On the contrary, its capabilities have been enormously important. The problem is that a country cannot assume that access to a privately controlled service will always be available on precisely the terms it requires.
For Ukraine, developing an alternative would not mean abandoning Starlink immediately. It would mean reducing the risk of relying on a single provider.
Europe is already building alternatives
Ukraine’s agreement comes as the European Union advances its much larger IRIS² satellite communications programme.
In August 2026, the European Commission and the SpaceRISE consortium signed an implementation agreement for a constellation of 348 satellites. The first launches are scheduled for 2029, with services intended to be introduced progressively. The network is designed to provide secure communications for European governments, defence and security forces, and emergency services.
The programme is moving beyond planning. Airbus and Thales Alenia Space have begun work on the first layer of satellites, with delivery of that initial group scheduled for 2029.
IRIS² is not simply an attempt to copy every feature of Starlink. Its main emphasis is secure, resilient connectivity for governments and strategic users, alongside commercial services.
Europe also has Eutelsat’s OneWeb network, which already operates satellites providing connectivity to businesses, governments and other customers. Nokia and ICEYE represent another approach, developing systems intended to give individual nations greater control over their communications infrastructure.
These projects are complementary rather than a single, unified replacement for Starlink. Together, however, they demonstrate a clear effort to establish more European-controlled capacity.
It is about more than satellites
The wider issue is technological dependence.
Over recent decades, European businesses, public services and consumers have increasingly relied on American companies for cloud computing, software, digital platforms, artificial intelligence and communications. Many of these services are excellent and offer economies of scale that would be difficult to reproduce nationally.
Yet dependence creates risks. Access to services can be affected by commercial disputes, changing prices, export restrictions, sanctions, cybersecurity concerns or political disagreements. Governments may discover that owning their data is not the same as controlling the infrastructure on which that data depends.
Satellite communications provide a particularly visible example because their strategic importance is immediate during a conflict. But the same underlying question applies to cloud services, computer chips, AI systems and other essential technologies.
There is a distinction between buying technology from an overseas supplier and being unable to operate effectively without that supplier’s continued cooperation.
That does not mean Europe should attempt to manufacture everything itself. Complete technological self-sufficiency would be prohibitively expensive and, in many areas, unrealistic. The more practical objective is to have alternatives available for critical services, together with the ability to switch providers or maintain essential operations during a crisis.
Can Europe catch up?
Starlink enjoys a substantial head start. It already has a large operating constellation, established customers, user equipment and experience delivering broadband at scale.
Europe’s new systems will take years to deploy. They will need reliable launch arrangements, ground stations, terminals, financing and enough customers to justify their costs. Governments will also have to decide how much they are prepared to pay for resilience that might be most valuable during an emergency.
Nor does European ownership automatically guarantee independence. Components, launch services and other parts of the supply chain may still come from abroad.
Nevertheless, the calculation changes when governments regard a system as essential national infrastructure rather than simply another commercial service.
Canada is pursuing its own approach through Telesat’s Lightspeed low-Earth-orbit satellite network, illustrating that the interest in alternatives extends beyond the European Union. Different countries have different requirements, but the shared concern is the security of communications.
What does this mean for Britain?
The United Kingdom faces a particular question. It is outside the European Union, but it remains closely connected to European security and has its own requirements for military communications, emergency resilience and remote connectivity.
The UK will need to consider whether it can obtain dependable access to European systems, whether it should support domestic capabilities, and how far it wishes to rely on American providers.
For Scotland, satellite communications could have practical applications in remote communities, maritime operations and emergency response. But the immediate benefit to households should not be overstated: the first priority for these new networks is likely to be government, defence and other strategic customers, rather than cheaper broadband subscriptions.
The longer-term issue is whether more competition and alternative infrastructure will eventually widen consumer choice.
A change in strategic thinking
The Nokia-ICEYE agreement with Ukraine is still an exploratory step, not a completed satellite network. IRIS² is also years away from full deployment. Neither will remove European dependence on Starlink in the near future.
But the direction of travel matters.
For years, the advantages of using established American technology often outweighed concerns about dependence. The latest geopolitical tensions are encouraging governments to reconsider that balance.
The lesson is not that American technology should be rejected. It is that essential national capabilities should not depend entirely on decisions made by a company or government outside a country's control.
Ukraine has provided a real-world demonstration of the stakes involved. Europe’s satellite programmes suggest that governments are beginning to respond.
The ultimate test will not be how many satellites are announced, or how many agreements are signed. It will be whether countries can keep their communications running when circumstances become difficult and they most need them.
Technological independence may be expensive, but the experience of Ukraine is helping governments understand the potential cost of having no alternative.