26th October 2026
Four major telecoms companies want a share of valuable satellite frequencies, but Washington is warning of retaliation as Europe seeks greater control over its communications infrastructure.
Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on American technology have opened another front in an increasingly important dispute with the United States. This time, the argument concerns radio frequencies that could allow ordinary mobile phones to connect directly to satellites, potentially transforming communications in remote areas and providing another option when conventional mobile networks fail.
On 19 October, four of Europe’s largest telecommunications groups, Deutsche Telekom, Orange, Telefónica and Vodafone, announced that they had signed a letter of intent to explore a joint bid for satellite radio spectrum. Their aim is to help develop a European-controlled service that would connect satellites with existing mobile networks.
The announcement followed a European Commission proposal to change how valuable satellite frequencies are allocated when existing licences expire in May 2027.
The plan has attracted strong opposition from American interests, including Elon Musk’s SpaceX, which operates Starlink. The US ambassador to the European Union has warned that European companies could face severe retaliation if American operators are unfairly excluded.
What might appear to be a technical dispute over radio frequencies has therefore become part of a much wider argument about technological independence, competition and the future of transatlantic trade.
Why these particular frequencies matter
Radio spectrum is a limited resource. Satellites and mobile networks need access to specific frequencies to transmit information without interfering with other communications systems.
The European Commission is proposing a new system for allocating the 2 GHz mobile satellite services band, which is particularly relevant to direct-to-device connectivity. Existing rights are due to expire in May 2027.
Under the Commission’s proposed framework, the available spectrum would be divided into three broad portions. One would support secure government communications linked to the EU’s IRIS² programme. Another would be intended for European commercial entrants, while the remaining portion would be open to qualifying European and non-European operators.
The proposal has not yet become a completed allocation of licences. The final rules and selection process will determine precisely which companies can use the frequencies and on what conditions.
Nevertheless, the direction is clear. Brussels wants to encourage European-controlled satellite services while ensuring that the technology can support both commercial connectivity and government security requirements.
What do the four telecoms companies want?
Deutsche Telekom, Orange, Telefónica and Vodafone are exploring a joint bid because working together could give them greater scale and bargaining power than acting separately.
They already have millions of customers and extensive mobile networks across Europe. Satellite connectivity could extend those services to locations where building conventional mobile infrastructure is difficult or uneconomic.
The companies are not proposing to build an entire satellite constellation themselves at this stage. Instead, they intend to develop the necessary European ground infrastructure and work with a satellite operator, which has yet to be selected.
That distinction matters. Europe has companies with considerable telecommunications expertise, but matching Starlink’s existing constellation and launch capabilities would be an enormous undertaking.
A partnership could allow European operators to develop a service more quickly while retaining greater control over how it is offered to customers and integrated with their existing networks.
Why is America objecting?
American companies have invested heavily in satellite communications and want access to the European market. SpaceX has an established constellation, while other American operators are also developing satellite services that can connect directly to mobile devices.
From Washington’s perspective, reserving part of a valuable market for European-controlled operators risks giving local companies an advantage over American competitors.
The US ambassador’s warning about possible retaliation shows that the dispute is being taken seriously. However, no specific retaliatory measures have been announced, and the precise response will depend partly on the final European rules.
There is also a legitimate question about the distinction between protecting national security and protecting domestic businesses from competition. Governments may reasonably want control over communications needed for defence and emergencies. But restricting commercial access to frequencies can also be viewed as protectionism, particularly if the rules disadvantage foreign companies without a clear and proportionate justification.
The European Commission will need to explain why its proposed allocation is necessary, how the selection criteria will work and whether the arrangements treat competing applicants fairly.
The Starlink factor
Starlink gives this dispute a wider significance.
The war in Ukraine demonstrated how important satellite communications can become when conventional networks are damaged or unavailable. It also highlighted the strategic implications of depending on a service controlled by a private company outside the country using it.
Europe is responding through several initiatives, including IRIS², existing services from Eutelsat’s OneWeb network and the emerging direct-to-device market.
The objective is not necessarily to eliminate American technology. It is to ensure that Europe has alternatives available when communications become strategically important.
Direct-to-device connectivity could also benefit ordinary consumers. In the future, compatible phones may be able to maintain basic connections in areas without mobile coverage, although the services available will depend on the technology, spectrum and commercial arrangements.
For rural communities, remote roads and maritime users, the technology could improve safety and connectivity. It will not, however, immediately replace conventional mobile networks or guarantee lower prices.
Could this lead to a wider trade dispute?
That is a risk, although it is not inevitable.
If Washington concludes that the European rules deliberately disadvantage American companies, it could consider measures affecting European businesses operating in the United States. Such action could extend the argument beyond satellite communications into wider questions of digital trade, public procurement and technology regulation.
But the two sides also have strong reasons to negotiate. European telecommunications companies have commercial interests in the American market, while American technology firms benefit from access to European customers. A dispute that damages both sides could become expensive.
Much will depend on the final allocation rules, the eligibility requirements for foreign operators and whether a compromise can be reached before the existing licences expire.
A bigger question about technological independence
Europe’s satellite ambitions are part of a wider reassessment of dependence on foreign technology, covering artificial intelligence, cloud computing, computer chips and telecommunications.
For years, buying established technology from American companies often made commercial sense. Building alternatives required substantial investment and could mean starting well behind the market leaders.
The calculation changes when governments believe that reliance on a single foreign supplier could create economic or security vulnerabilities.
There is a danger, however, that attempts to create European alternatives could become expensive protectionism without delivering competitive services. Securing frequencies is only the first step. Europe still needs satellites, ground infrastructure, investment, customers and technology capable of delivering reliable services.
The United States is entitled to challenge arrangements it believes unfairly discriminate against its companies. Europe, in turn, has a legitimate interest in protecting essential communications and developing its own capabilities. The difficult task is to distinguish justified security measures from rules designed primarily to keep competitors out.
The coming months will show whether this becomes a negotiated adjustment to Europe's satellite market or a more serious confrontation between allies.
The immediate issue is who gets access to a limited band of radio frequencies. The larger question is how far Europe is prepared to go to reduce its dependence on American technology, and how far Washington is prepared to go to defend the commercial position of its own companies.