8th November 2026
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has changed the way European countries think about defence. For decades, many NATO members reduced their military spending, believing that a major conventional war in Europe was increasingly unlikely. That assumption has now been seriously challenged.
Russia is rebuilding and expanding its military capabilities, while countries closest to its borders, particularly Poland and Finland, are taking increasingly practical steps to prepare for a potentially more dangerous future.
Britain has recognised the changing circumstances and announced substantial increases in defence expenditure. But an important question remains: is the UK doing enough, and will the additional money translate into the military capability needed if Europe faces a prolonged conflict?
Russia's military expansion cannot be ignored
The scale of Russia's military commitment is considerable. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russian military expenditure increased by 5.9% in 2025 to an estimated $190 billion, equivalent to 7.5% of its gross domestic product.
Russia is directing enormous resources towards weapons production, missiles, drones, artillery and other military equipment. Its armed forces are also gaining considerable experience of modern warfare through the conflict in Ukraine.
There is no certainty that Russia intends to attack another European country. However, NATO considers Russia the most significant and direct threat to the security of its members.
Even if the war in Ukraine eventually ends, Russia could use the following years to rebuild its conventional military strength. European governments therefore have to consider not just the immediate conflict but what Russia might be capable of doing several years from now.
Poland and Finland are taking the threat seriously
Two countries provide particularly interesting examples of how attitudes towards defence are changing.
Poland has embarked on one of Europe's most ambitious military expansion programmes. Its military expenditure reached approximately 4.5% of GDP in 2025, according to SIPRI, making it one of NATO's biggest spenders relative to the size of its economy.
It is purchasing tanks, artillery, aircraft and missile systems, including substantial orders from South Korea and the United States. Poland is also expanding its armed forces and rebuilding military capacity after supplying equipment to Ukraine.
Finland has a different but equally interesting approach. Having a long border with Russia, it has maintained a strong emphasis on national defence even during periods when other European countries reduced military spending.
Conscription, a substantial trained reserve and a wider system of national preparedness are important parts of its approach. Finland's concept of defence extends beyond the armed forces to include the resilience of essential services and the ability of society to function during a crisis.
These countries are not simply buying more weapons. They are considering what would happen if they had to defend themselves for an extended period.
Britain is increasing defence expenditure
The UK government has announced a substantial increase in defence investment.
Its Defence Investment Plan, published in June 2026, provides for almost £298 billion of Ministry of Defence spending over four years.
The government's spending plans envisage defence expenditure reaching 2.7% of GDP from 2027–28, with a commitment to reach 3% in the next Parliament. Britain has also committed to NATO's longer-term target of spending 3.5% of GDP on core defence by 2035, alongside a further 1.5% on wider security-related expenditure.
The investment programme includes £5 billion for drones and autonomous systems, £11 billion for munitions and weapons, and substantial investment in submarines, aircraft, naval capabilities and space technology.
There are also plans to establish at least six new munitions and energetics factories in Britain.
These investments are important. Modern warfare is increasingly dependent on drones, electronic systems, surveillance technology and precision weapons. Britain cannot expect to rely indefinitely on equipment designed for a different era.
However, announcing investment is not the same as having the equipment available, factories operating and sufficient ammunition in storage.
The uncomfortable question of military readiness
One of the most important lessons from Ukraine is that a modern conflict can consume enormous quantities of equipment and ammunition.
Advanced missiles and aircraft attract considerable attention, but conventional artillery shells, replacement drones, spare parts and basic military supplies are equally important.
A country might possess some of the most sophisticated weapons in the world but still struggle to sustain a prolonged conflict if its ammunition stocks are inadequate or its defence industry cannot replace equipment quickly enough.
Britain has faced questions about military readiness, recruitment, personnel retention and the availability of equipment. These are not problems that can necessarily be solved simply by increasing the annual defence budget.
The armed forces need sufficient trained personnel, reliable equipment and the capacity to maintain operations over months or years.
There is also the question of how quickly Britain could expand production if a serious international crisis developed. Building factories, training specialist workers and securing supply chains takes time.
The government's investment in domestic manufacturing is therefore important, but the planned construction of new facilities extending towards 2030 illustrates that some of the improvements will not happen overnight.
Defence is about more than tanks, aircraft and ships
There is another aspect of national security that deserves greater attention.
Modern warfare does not necessarily begin with an invasion. Cyberattacks, sabotage, interference with communications and attacks on critical infrastructure can cause serious disruption without conventional military operations.
Britain depends on an increasingly interconnected network of electricity supplies, telecommunications, ports, airports, undersea cables, fuel distribution and computer systems.
The vulnerability of these systems has become an important consideration for governments and security organisations.
For Scotland, this has particular relevance. Electricity transmission infrastructure, energy installations, ports, communications links and offshore facilities are important to both the regional economy and national security.
The protection of undersea cables and energy infrastructure around the British coastline is not simply a matter for the armed forces. It also involves government departments, infrastructure operators, regulators and emergency services.
National resilience requires these organisations to work together and have plans for serious disruption.
Who pays for the expansion?
Increasing defence spending also brings difficult financial choices.
The government has announced an additional £15 billion for its Defence Investment Plan over four years, but the funding arrangements involve savings and reallocations across government departments.
The official funding explanation identifies £10.3 billion of funding measures, with a further £4.7 billion to be confirmed at the 2026 Budget.
There will inevitably be debate about the balance between defence, public services, infrastructure investment, taxation and borrowing.
There is also an economic argument for rebuilding Britain's defence manufacturing capacity. Investment in factories, engineering, electronics, research and skilled employment could provide opportunities for British businesses and workers.
However, defence procurement has a history of delays and cost overruns. The public will reasonably expect evidence that additional money is producing usable equipment and improved military capability rather than simply larger budgets.
Britain needs to think beyond the next spending announcement
Britain remains a significant military power. It has nuclear weapons, advanced aircraft, submarines, intelligence capabilities and an important role within NATO.
It would be wrong to suggest that the country has ignored the changing security situation. The increases in defence spending and the new investment programme demonstrate that the government recognises the need for change.
Nevertheless, the comparison with Poland and Finland raises legitimate questions about the speed and scale of Britain's preparations.
The most important test is not whether Britain announces another increase in defence expenditure. It is whether the armed forces can mobilise effectively, whether sufficient equipment and ammunition are available, whether the country can protect its infrastructure and whether domestic industry can replenish supplies during a prolonged emergency.
There is also a wider European consideration. NATO's strength depends on its members being able to support one another. Britain cannot assume that American military resources will always be available in the same quantities or on the same terms as in previous decades.
Europe will increasingly have to take responsibility for its own security.
Russia's future intentions cannot be known with certainty, and there is no reason to assume that a wider European war is inevitable. But preparing for the possibility of a serious conflict is part of responsible government.
Britain has started the process of rebuilding its defence capabilities. The question now is whether it can turn its spending commitments into practical military strength quickly enough.
In an increasingly uncertain Europe, the cost of being unprepared could be considerably greater than the cost of preparing properly.
Russia Is Rebuilding Its Military Factories – Not Just Its Army
One aspect of Russia's rearmament deserves particular attention. It is not simply buying more weapons or recruiting additional soldiers. It is investing heavily in the factories, machinery, production lines and workforce needed to manufacture military equipment on an industrial scale.
Satellite photographs taken over several years have provided a remarkable insight into the scale of this expansion. Facilities that were relatively modest industrial sites have been enlarged, new production buildings constructed and supporting infrastructure developed. Some of these developments were already visible around five years ago. They are now becoming operational production centres.
A particularly striking example is the drone manufacturing complex at Yelabuga in Tatarstan. An investigation published by the American Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in March 2026 compared satellite imagery from October 2021 with photographs taken in late 2025 and early 2026.
The transformation is considerable. What began with two buildings under construction has developed into a complex containing 17 facilities and up to 116 buildings. The wider site now includes production facilities, storage areas and substantial accommodation for workers.
The complex manufactures Russia's Geran attack drones, based on the Iranian-designed Shahed. CSIS reported that production was estimated to exceed 5,500 drones a month. This illustrates how quickly a country can develop a large-scale weapons manufacturing operation when the government makes it a national priority.
The expansion is not confined to drones. Russia has also been investing in ammunition, missile production, aircraft manufacturing, armoured vehicles and air defence systems.
An assessment published by Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service in 2026 estimated that Russian military industry produced approximately seven million artillery shells, mortar rounds and rockets during 2025. It also reported that artillery ammunition production had increased more than seventeenfold since 2021.
These figures are particularly significant because Russia has managed to increase production while continuing to supply its forces fighting in Ukraine. The Estonian assessment suggests that Russia is also beginning to replenish some of its strategic ammunition reserves for possible future conflicts.
A July 2026 study by the American CSIS examined five major Russian defence companies involved in tanks, air defence, electronic warfare, weapons and drones. It found that Russia's defence industry had expanded production, increased its specialised workforce and become more consolidated around major state-backed companies.
There are, however, weaknesses. Russia faces shortages of skilled workers, difficulties obtaining advanced machinery and electronic components, and the additional costs associated with international sanctions. Not every new building is necessarily operating at full production capacity. Nevertheless, the overall direction of travel is clear.
The important distinction is between producing weapons to replace those being lost in Ukraine and building an industrial base capable of supplying a much larger military in the future.
This is where European governments need to pay particular attention. Russia's factories are being expanded now, while many NATO countries are still working through the lengthy process of approving defence budgets, placing orders and constructing new production facilities.
There is a danger that Western countries will measure their progress by how much money they have allocated to defence, while Russia measures its progress by how many weapons it can manufacture.
Britain's own plans to establish additional munitions factories and increase domestic production are therefore important. However, the question is whether these developments can be delivered quickly enough.
A modern military needs more than sophisticated aircraft, ships and tanks. It needs a continuous supply of ammunition, missiles, drones, spare parts and replacement equipment. In a prolonged conflict, the ability to manufacture and replenish supplies may become just as important as the size of the armed forces themselves.
Russia appears to have understood this lesson and is investing accordingly. Britain and its NATO partners need to ensure that their own defence industries can respond on a comparable industrial scale.