9th November 2026
Political changes in Israel and Washington could shape the next phase of the Iran conflict. With Stephen Miller taking charge at the White House and Benjamin Netanyahu facing the prospect of losing power, the coming weeks could prove critical for the Middle East and the world economy.
The war involving the United States, Israel and Iran has already demonstrated how quickly a regional conflict can become a global economic problem. Oil prices, shipping costs, fuel supplies and household energy bills have all been affected.
Now, two important political developments could influence what happens next. In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu has suffered a major electoral setback and opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot has been selected to try to form a government. In Washington, Donald Trump has appointed Stephen Miller as his new White House chief of staff, replacing Susie Wiles.
These developments come at a particularly sensitive moment. The American midterm elections have also delivered control of both chambers of Congress to the Democrats, creating a new political obstacle for Trump as he considers his next moves against Iran.
The question is whether these changes will encourage a move towards negotiations or make another military escalation more likely.
Netanyahu's political future is uncertain
Israel's election on 27 October has weakened Netanyahu's position.
His right-wing coalition secured 53 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, short of the 61 required for a parliamentary majority. The opposition grouping associated with Gadi Eisenkot secured 48 seats, while Arab-led parties won 19.
On 7 November, President Isaac Herzog announced that he intended to ask Eisenkot to form a government. He is due to receive the formal mandate on 8 November and will have 28 days, with a possible extension of 14 days, to negotiate an agreement.
The arithmetic is complicated. Arab-led parties have given Eisenkot important support, but relying on them to sustain a government presents political difficulties for some of his potential partners.
Netanyahu has not necessarily exhausted his political options, but his position is considerably less secure.
This matters internationally because Netanyahu has been pressing Washington to take further military action against Iran. His government has consistently argued that Iran represents an existential security threat to Israel.
A new Israeli administration might take a different approach to the conduct of the conflict, although Eisenkot is a former military chief and should not automatically be regarded as a less confrontational figure on Iranian security.
A change of government would not necessarily mean an end to Israeli military operations or a fundamental change in its attitude towards Tehran.
Stephen Miller takes charge at the White House
Across the Atlantic, Trump has made a significant appointment of his own.
On 6 November, he announced that Stephen Miller would replace Susie Wiles as White House chief of staff, taking up the position on Monday, 9 November.
Miller is already one of Trump's closest political advisers and has been a central architect of his immigration policies and wider America First agenda.
His appointment is important because he is regarded as a hardliner who favours strong executive action and has supported military action against Iran.
The change comes after the Republicans suffered a major defeat in the midterm elections. Democrats have taken control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
There is a possible interpretation of this appointment that deserves attention.
Trump has suffered a political setback at home. Rather than responding by moderating his policies, he has promoted a particularly loyal and combative adviser to the most influential administrative position in the White House.
That does not mean Miller will determine American military policy. Trump remains president and makes the final decisions. However, the chief of staff has considerable influence over which advice reaches the president, how decisions are organised and which policy priorities receive attention.
Miller's appointment could therefore reinforce a more confrontational approach, although it is too early to conclude that this will happen.
The American midterm results create another complication
The Democrats' victory is particularly important because the Iran conflict has become an economic and political issue inside the United States.
Higher petrol prices, rising living costs and the financial cost of the war have contributed to dissatisfaction with the administration.
Vice-President JD Vance has publicly acknowledged the political damage caused by the conflict, while Trump has continued to defend the decision to attack Iran.
The incoming Democratic-controlled Congress will have several ways of challenging the administration.
It can investigate the conduct and cost of the war, scrutinise military spending and use its control of congressional committees to demand explanations.
Most importantly, Congress controls government appropriations. That gives Democrats potential leverage over the financing of continued military operations.
However, there is an important limitation. Trump remains commander-in-chief and retains considerable authority over foreign policy and military operations. The Democrats do not have the numbers to override a presidential veto.
Furthermore, the new Congress does not take office until January. In the meantime, Trump retains considerable freedom of action.
There is therefore a potentially awkward period between now and January when the president could make important military decisions before the new congressional arrangements take effect.
Could the Iran conflict escalate again?
This is where the different developments become particularly important.
The American midterm results initially encouraged financial markets to believe that Trump might be more reluctant to restart major military operations.
Oil prices fell sharply as investors considered the possibility that Washington would seek a negotiated settlement rather than prolong the conflict.
However, the military situation remains dangerous.
On 5 November, Reuters reported further tanker incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, with at least five vessels reporting incidents since the previous Sunday. The shipping risks have not disappeared.
On 8 November, the Associated Press reported that American forces had disabled a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Oman after it attempted to leave the area following a visit to an Iranian port, in breach of the American naval blockade. Reports of further explosions and tanker incidents have added to uncertainty.
Netanyahu has also reportedly pressed Trump to resume strikes against Iran.
There are consequently competing pressures on the American president.
On one side, there is the economic and political cost of a prolonged war, pressure from voters and the prospect of a hostile Congress.
On the other, there are demands from Israel for further action, the continuing confrontation with Iran and advisers who favour a harder line.
The appointment of Miller adds another element to this calculation.
There is also a danger of miscalculation. An attack on a tanker, an American military installation or an important energy facility could trigger retaliation that neither side originally intended to escalate into a wider campaign.
The Houthis in Yemen add another complication. Their involvement could threaten shipping through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, creating problems for an alternative shipping route already important to international trade.
Oil prices: the economic consequences could be considerable
For Britain, the most immediate concern is what happens to oil and gas prices.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most important energy shipping routes. Before the conflict, roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies passed through it.
Disruption does not have to mean a complete closure to cause serious problems. Insurance premiums, longer shipping journeys, tanker availability and uncertainty over deliveries can all increase costs.
Brent crude has already experienced substantial volatility.
Reuters reported that Brent settled at $98.29 a barrel on 5 November, after a sharp fall earlier in the week followed by a rebound of more than $3. The market had been reacting to both the prospect of renewed diplomacy and fresh attacks on shipping.
The figures illustrate how quickly expectations can change.
There are three broad possibilities for the coming weeks.
First, a diplomatic breakthrough. If Washington and Tehran reach an agreement covering the blockade, shipping through Hormuz and Iran's nuclear programme, oil prices could fall further. However, markets will want evidence that ships can travel safely and reliably before removing much of the risk premium.
Second, a prolonged stalemate. This could mean continued restrictions on shipping, sporadic attacks and uncertainty over supplies. Oil prices could remain elevated and fluctuate sharply as each new incident changes market expectations.
Third, a renewed military escalation. Further American and Israeli attacks, followed by Iranian retaliation against shipping or energy infrastructure, could push prices considerably higher. Reuters reported that some market analysts saw a potential Brent range of $110 to $125 in an escalation scenario.
These are scenario estimates, not guaranteed price forecasts.
The situation would become considerably more serious if the conflict spread to Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure or if the Houthis intensified attacks on Red Sea shipping.
The combination of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb being threatened would put two major international energy and shipping corridors under pressure simultaneously.
What could this mean for Britain and Scotland?
Britain is not directly dependent on every shipment passing through Hormuz, but international oil and gas markets are interconnected.
Higher crude prices feed into petrol and diesel costs. They also influence aviation fuel, shipping, transport and the cost of producing and distributing goods.
For households using heating oil, the consequences can be particularly direct. A sustained increase in international oil prices can eventually feed through to domestic heating oil quotations.
Electricity prices can also be affected through the wholesale gas market, although the relationship is not a simple one-for-one calculation.
Businesses face additional pressure from transport costs, energy bills, insurance and the cost of raw materials.
For Caithness and Sutherland, where distances are considerable and many households and businesses depend on road transport, these increases can be particularly difficult to absorb.
There is also a wider inflation problem. If energy prices remain high, businesses may eventually pass some of their additional costs to customers. That could make it harder for the Bank of England to reduce interest rates and could increase pressure on household budgets.
The effects would extend well beyond the price displayed on a petrol station sign.
The next few weeks could be decisive
Several developments deserve close attention.
The first is whether Eisenkot can actually form an Israeli government. His success or failure could change the political calculations in Jerusalem, although Israel's security concerns will remain.
The second is whether Trump authorises further attacks on Iran now that the American midterms are over. His political position has changed, but his military authority has not.
The third is whether Stephen Miller's appointment translates into a harder approach towards Iran or whether other advisers, particularly those concerned about the economic cost of the war, influence the president in the opposite direction.
The fourth is whether negotiations can produce a workable agreement on the Strait of Hormuz, the American blockade and Iran's nuclear programme.
Finally, shipping incidents and the security of Saudi and other Gulf energy infrastructure need to be watched closely.
There is no certainty that the conflict will widen, and there are powerful reasons for all sides to seek a settlement. But there are also political and military pressures that could push events in the opposite direction.
For Britain, the distinction is important. A diplomatic settlement could bring some relief to energy markets, although prices would not necessarily return immediately to their previous levels. A renewed military campaign could reverse recent falls in oil prices and create another wave of inflation just when households and businesses are already under considerable financial pressure.
The Middle East conflict is no longer simply a distant military confrontation. It has become an important influence on the cost of living, the price of energy and the prospects for economic stability in Britain. The political decisions taken in Washington and Jerusalem over the next few weeks could be felt in household budgets thousands of miles away.